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ABSTRACT
Section 77 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 sets out the orders that 
a court can make after finding an accused unfit to stand trial on account of 
his mental illness or intellectual disability. All the orders result in detention 
of the unfit accused in prison or a psychiatric institution (depending on the 
nature of the charges against the accused) in terms of the Mental Health 
Care Act 17 of 2002. The court could not consider the treatability of the 
accused’s condition or any individual circumstances of the accused before 
ordering such detention. Section 77 was recently amended by the Criminal 
Procedure Amendment Act 4 of 2017. The Amendment Act resulted from 
the Constitutional court’s judgment in De Vos NO v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development 2015 (2) SACR 217 (CC) where the court found, 
inter alia, that such limited orders deprive the court of its discretion to 
craft an order that is suitable for the particular unfit accused. The court 
ruled on the constitutionality of detaining an unfit accused in prison or 
a psychiatric institution and found some provisions of s 77 that facilitates 
such detention, unconstitutional. The Amendment Act brings s 77 in line 
with the Constitution. This contribution explores the orders available to the 
court before and after the amendment of s 77 and conveys the crux of the 
court’s judgment in the De Vos matter pertaining to the unconstitutionality 
of certain provisions of s 77. It concludes that the amendment bolsters, in 
particular, the unfit accused’s right to freedom and security of the person 
as the court may now order the conditional or unconditional release of the 
unfit accused where appropriate.
1 Introduction
Section 77 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (hereinafter the 
‘Criminal Procedure Act’) determines the fate of an accused who is 
unable, because of mental illness or intellectual disability, to follow 
the criminal proceedings against him. This accused is ‘unfit to stand 
trial’ (hereinafter the ‘unfit accused’).
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Until recently, by default an accused faced detention in prison or 
an institution under s 77(6) once found unfit to stand trial. The court 
could not order the release, conditional or otherwise, of an unfit 
accused regardless of the accused’s individual circumstances or nature 
of the mental illness. The court’s lack of discretion under s 77(6) was 
challenged in the Constitutional Court judgment of De Vos NO v Minister 
of Justice and Constitutional Development.1 This judgment declared 
some provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act as they apply to the 
unfit accused unconstitutional on the basis that they violate the unfit 
accused’s right to freedom and security of the person. The Criminal 
Procedure Amendment Act 4 of 2017 (hereinafter the Amendment Act) 
remedies this unconstitutionality. The Amendment Act which came into 
force on 29 June 2017, enables the court to exercise discretion and to, 
inter alia, order the unconditional release of an unfit accused. 
This contribution gives an overview of the orders available to the court 
after a finding of unfitness and the consequences of such orders under the 
Criminal Procedure Act prior to its most recent amendment. A discussion 
of selected aspects of the De Vos judgment highlights the challenges with 
s 77(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act. The orders available to the court 
under the Amendment Act is explored and contrasted with those previously 
available to the court. The contribution concludes with comments on the 
positive impact of these amendments on the unfit accused. The position of 
children who may be unfit to stand trial is specifically excluded from this 
contribution as it warrants a separate discussion.
2  Fitness to stand trial under the Criminal Procedure Act 
prior to 2017 amendment
2.1 Introduction
An accused’s ability to follow the court proceedings and to instruct 
their legal representative is assessed by mental health professionals at a 
licenced psychiatric facility2 before a court makes a finding on fitness.3 
1 2015 (2) SACR 217 (CC) (hereinafter ‘De Vos CC case’)
2 Fitness assessments are usually conducted on an in-patient basis at a psychiatric 
facility licensed to conduct court-ordered assessments: AL Pillay ‘Could S v Pistorius 
influence reform in the traditional forensic mental health evaluation format?’ (2014) 
44 SA J Psychology 377. The assessment is conducted by one psychiatrist if the 
accused is charged with a non-violent crime and by a panel of psychiatrists if 
the charge against the accused involved violence. See L Pienaar ‘Deciphering the 
composition of section 79-assessment panels in the Criminal Procedure Amendment 
Act 4 of 2017’ (2017) 20 PELJ 1-25 for an explanation of how the assessment panels 
are compiled since the enactment of the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 4 of 
2017.
3 The accused is referred to an assessment of his fitness to stand trial in terms of s 79 
of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
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A fitness assessment involves various interviews, tests and physical 
examinations.4 Once the assessment is concluded, the mental health 
professional(s) submits a report to court indicating the accused’s 
diagnosis5 and an opinion on whether the accused is fit to stand trial.6 
The court considers this report in reaching a finding on the fitness of 
the accused.
2.2 Finding on fitness
The finding on fitness can be made at any point in the criminal 
proceedings before sentencing.7
If the accused is found fit to stand trial, the criminal trial continues.8
4 FJW Calitz, PHJJ van Rensburg, C Fourie, E Liebenberg, C van den Berg and 
G Joubert ‘Psychiatric evaluation of offenders referred to the Free State Psychiatric 
Complex according to ss 77 and 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act’ (2006) 12 SA 
J Psychiatry 47 at 48. Also see Pillay op cit (n2) 377 at 378, who explains the 
forensic assessment includes interviews with the accused and family members of 
the accused, psychometric tests and reports from multidisciplinary teams on the 
accused person’s behaviour generally and interpersonally. 
5 Section 79(4)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. Also, see JJ Joubert 
(ed) Strafprosesreg 10ed (2011) at 251. See further AL Pillay ‘Competency to stand 
trial and criminal responsibility examinations: Are there solutions to the extensive 
waiting list?’ (2014) 44 SA J Psychology 48 at 50, who maintains that it is not the 
diagnosis in itself that renders a person fit or unfit to stand trial, but that the 
functional impairment of the individual has to be assessed as well. Mental illness 
is defined in the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002 s 1 as: ‘A positive diagnosis 
of mental health related illness in terms of accepted diagnostic criteria made by a 
mental health care practitioner authorized to make such diagnoses.’
6 Section 79(4)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. Also, see E Du Toit, FJ De 
Jager, A Paizes, A St Q Skeen and SE van der Merwe Commentary on the Criminal 
Procedure Act (2012) 13-5 and 13-6.
7 Du Toit op cit (n6) 13-3 indicates that the issue is usually raised and an order on 
fitness made before the trial commences. The order on fitness can be made even 
after conviction but prior to sentencing as was the case in S v April 1985 (1) SA 639 
(NC). See further S v Van As 1989 (3) SA 881 (W) where the proceedings were set 
aside upon review by the high court after it became clear (after conviction) that the 
accused was not able to conduct a proper defence. Where the proceedings are set 
aside, the relevant order in terms of s 77(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act is made. 
A Kruger Hiemstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses 7ed (2010) 225. The setting aside of 
proceedings any time after the accused entered a plea, shall lead to an acquittal. See 
s 6(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. Where the charges are withdrawn 
prior to a plea being entered, the accused is not entitled to a verdict of acquittal 
in respect of the particular charges: see s 6(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 
1977. Also see A Kruger Mental Health Law in South Africa (1980) 159 who states 
that, at the time, the withdrawal of charges against a mentally ill accused was a 
common occurrence, especially where the charges were for minor offences. Where 
the prosecution decides to cease prosecution of an accused who entered a plea and 
whose fitness to stand trial is at issue, such an accused must be found not guilty. 
Also see S v M 1989 (3) SA 887 (W) at 890D-H, 891E. See also Joubert op cit (n5) 251.
8 Section 77(5) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
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An accused found unfit to stand trial may not, however, be tried 
while he is incapable of understanding the proceedings.9 A trial on the 
facts may be held to establish whether the unfit accused committed 
the crime (act) of which he stands accused.10 The Criminal Matters 
Amendment Act 68 of 1998 amended s 77 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act to provide for this trial on the facts during which the court 
considers evidence to determine whether an unfit accused actually 
committed the act in question. The purpose of this trial on the facts is 
not to reach an official verdict on the guilt of the accused but is rather 
an inquiry during which the court should satisfy itself as to what actus 
reus, if any, the accused committed.11 The burden of proof for this 
inquiry is on a balance of probabilities.12 After a trial on the facts, the 
accused is not convicted or acquitted, but instead, the court makes 
an order of detention under s 77(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act.13 
The seriousness of the charges against the unfit accused, considered 
with the outcome of the trial on the facts, guide the court to make the 
most suitable order in terms of s 77(6).14 The trial on the facts is an 
additional inquiry that aids the court in making the relevant detention 
9 S v Mabena 2007 (1) SACR 482 (SCA) at para [12]. Also, see Du Toit op cit (n6) 13-3. 
See further Joubert op cit (n5) 21. Also see Kruger Mental Health Law in South 
Africa op cit (n7) 164, who confirms the criminal law principle that a person who 
cannot follow the proceedings cannot be tried.
10 Section 77(6)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. Also see Kruger Hiemstra 
Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses op cit (n7) 230 and at 219 where it is explained that this 
amendment was brought about by amending s 77(6)(a) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act 51 of 1977 by making provision for a trial on the facts of the matter, which 
does not constitute an official trial for purposes of finding the accused guilty or not 
guilty.
11 S v Sithole 2005 (1) 311 (W) at 314H-315A.
12 The burden of proof for purposes of guilt is beyond reasonable doubt. The accused’s 
involvement in the act that he stands accused of need only be proved on a balance 
of probabilities during the trial on the facts as per s 77(6) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act 51 of 1977. See S v Sithole op cit (n11) at 315B. See R Louw ‘Principles of 
criminal law: Pathological and non-pathological criminal incapacity’ in S Kaliski 
(ed) Psycholegal Assessment in South Africa (2006) 43. See further Du Toit op cit 
(n6) 13-6.
13 More particularly, an order in terms of s 77(6)(a)(i) or (ii) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act 51 of 1977. Also see Kruger Hiemstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses op cit (n7) 
230. See further Du Toit op cit (n6) 13-6. 
14 The orders available to the court in terms of s 77(6) depend on whether violence 
was involved in the crime with which the mentally ill accused is charged. Only 
accused persons charged with a violent crime and found to have been involved in 
it can be declared a state patient, which is the most restrictive order that the court 
can make with regard to an unfit accused. Louw op cit (n12) 43. Also, see Kruger 
Hiemstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses op cit (n7) 230. 
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order under s 77(6).15 A s 77(6) order suspends criminal proceedings. 
The trial may however proceed should the accused regain his ability 
to stand trial.16 
Orders available to the court after a finding of unfitness are explored 
below.
2.3 Orders made after a finding of unfitness
Once an accused is found unfit to stand trial, the court must make an 
order under s 77(6). Section 77(6) compels the court to order the unfit 
accused’s detention as either a state patient (in prison or a psychiatric 
hospital) or an involuntary mental health care user (in a psychiatric 
facility) in terms of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002 (hereinafter 
the ‘Mental Health Care Act’).17 The court may not make any order 
other than one of those listed under s 77(6).18 An unfit accused is 
detained regardless of the outcome of the trial on the facts about 
whether he committed the act in question.19 
The criteria for and consequences of detention as a state patient and 
an involuntary mental health care user, respectively, is set out below. 
15 The accused is detained in terms of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002. Kruger 
Hiemstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses op cit (n7) 230. Kruger’s view on s 77(6)(a) 
is supported by Du Toit AJ who expressed the following view on behalf of the 
court in S v Sithole op cit (n11) at 314H-315A: ‘the subsection in my view does not 
envisage any enquiry in the nature of a trial or a “determination” or “finding” in 
the sense of a verdict or a judgment. Any such procedure would be completely 
inappropriate since the person who allegedly committed the act by definition is 
incapable of understanding the proceedings. All that appears to be required is 
that, before directing that an accused be detained and/or treated in terms of the 
appropriate provisions of the Mental Health Act the court should satisfy itself as to 
what actus reus, if any, he or she has committed.’ 
16 Section 77(7) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. See Louw op cit (n12) 43. See 
further F Cassim ‘The accused person’s competency to stand trial – a comparative 
perspective’ (2004) 45 Codicillus 17 at 20. Also see Du Toit et al Commentary at 13-3 
who adds that this does not however often happen.
17 Section 77(6)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 uses the word ‘shall’ 
indicating the lack of discretion in terms of making orders with regard to an unfit 
accused. 
18 See Kruger Hiemstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses op cit (n7) 230. The court will 
not, however, be obliged to make an order in terms of s 77(6) where the state 
withdraws the charges. See S v Kahita 1983 (4) SA 618 (C). Also see F Khan ‘De Vos 
NO v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development’ (2017) 59 SA Crime Q 39 
at 40.
19 Conditional or unconditional release is not possible. This fact confirms that the 
purpose of a trial on the facts for an unfit accused is not to determine the guilt of 
the accused with regard to the offence of which he stands accused, but rather to aid 
the court in deciding what the most appropriate form of detention under the Mental 
Health Care Act 17 of 2002 would be. 
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The consequences of detention also remain relevant for the orders 
available to the criminal court under s 77(6) post the 2017 Amendment.
2.3.1 Detention as state patient (s 77(6)(a)(i) order)
A state patient is a person so classified by a court directive in 
terms of s 77(6)(a)(i) or 78(6)(i)(aa) of the Criminal Procedure Act.20 
Section 77(6)(a)(i) states that where an unfit accused is charged with 
murder, culpable homicide, rape or another crime involving violence, 
and the court finds on a balance of probabilities the accused committed 
the act in question, the court must order the detention of the unfit 
accused in prison or a psychiatric hospital.21 Such accused is detained 
as a state patient in terms of the Mental Health Care Act until a judge in 
chambers orders his discharge.22 A state patient is, therefore, an unfit 
accused charged with a violent offence and found to have committed 
the act in question. The order of detention as state patient must be 
made in the presence of the unfit accused.23 
There is no limit on the period that a state patient should or may be 
detained since it is uncertain how long it will take to stabilise the illness 
or whether it will respond to treatment at all.24 The Mental Health Care 
Act provides for the periodic review of the mental condition of a state 
patient25 ensuring that a state patient, while at first detained for an 
20 Section 1 of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002. The term ‘state patient’ is not 
used in the Criminal Procedure Act, but the Mental Health Care Act makes express 
provision for this category of mental health care treatment and rehabilitation 
services in Chapter VI (ss 41-48) thereof.
21 Section 77(6)(a)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 states that: ‘…and 
the court shall direct that the accused— (i) in the case of a charge of murder or 
culpable homicide or rape or compelled rape as contemplated in sections 3 or 4 
of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act, 2007, 
respectively, or a charge involving serious violence or if the court considers it to 
be necessary in the public interest, where the court finds that the accused has 
committed the act in question, or any other offence involving serious violence, be 
detained in a psychiatric hospital or a prison pending the decision of a judge in 
chambers in terms of section 47 of the Mental Health Care Act, 2002’; Also see s 47 
of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002.
22 Section 77(6)(a)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 read with s 47 of the 
Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002. Only an accused found unfit to stand trial and 
charged with a crime involving serious violence can be declared a state patient and 
detained as such in terms of the Mental Health Care Act. Also see Khan op cit (n18) 
40. 
23 S v Eyden 1982 (4) SA 141 (T). Also, see Du Toit op cit (n6) 13-22. 
24 S Kaliski ‘Does the insanity defence lead to an abuse of human rights?’ (2012) 15 Afr 
J Psychiatry 83 at 85. 
25 Section 46(1) of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002. A review takes place within 
six months from the detention order and then every 12 months.
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unspecified period, is not detained indefinitely.26 A state patient can 
only be discharged by order of a judge in chambers27 after consideration 
of a report indicating the prognosis of the accused’s mental health 
status.28 An application for discharge is a laborious process29 and can 
only be made once every 12 months.30 If the accused regains his ability 
26 When the review is conducted as per s 46(1) of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 
2002, the report on the review must contain information on the future treatment of 
the state patient, the merits of granting leave of absence to the accused (s 45) or the 
discharge of the state patient. A complete discharge may be granted by a judge in 
chambers in terms of s 47(6) of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002.
27 Section 47 of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002. Also, see Cassim op cit (n16) 
20. See further Louw op cit (n12) 43. A Mental Health Review Board does not have 
the jurisdiction to order or confirm the release of a state patient as is the case with 
an assisted or involuntary mental health care user, perhaps leaving state patients 
vulnerable to unreasonably long periods of detention. The Mental Health Care Act 
17 of 2002 (s 19) sets out the functions and powers of the Mental Health Review 
Board and refers to tasks relating to assisted and involuntary mental health care 
users as well as mentally ill prisoners, but no mention is made of state patients.
28 Section 47(3)(a) of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002.
29 Section 47 of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002 provides for the applications 
for discharge of a state patient to be brought by the state patient himself, an official 
curator at litem or administrator, if appointed, the superintendent of the facility 
where the state patient is treated, the medical practitioner administering the mental 
health care treatment and rehabilitation services, spouse, next of kin or any other 
person authorised to act on behalf of the state patient. Section 47(1)(a)–(g) of the 
Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002. Also see Kruger Hiemstra Suid-Afrikaanse 
Strafproses op cit (n7) 231 who explains that in practice, the head of the health 
establishment where the state patient receives treatment sends the application for 
discharge to the Department of Defence, which in turn sends it to the Registrar 
of the relevant court in order for the application to be considered by a judge in 
chambers. The Department of Defence is the official curator ad litem of the state 
patient in this instance. C Bateman ‘The insanity of a criminal justice system’ 
(2005) 95 SA Med J 208 at 212 explains that it is very difficult to convince a judge 
that a person that was once found unfit to stand trial is no longer mentally ill 
or that such a person will now take his medication and will in general ‘behave’. 
Under older mental health legislation the practice was that the Attorney General 
would only request this release if the superintendent of the institution where the 
person involved was detained was willing to almost guarantee that the individual if 
released, would not commit a similar offence again. See J Milton ‘Law reform: The 
Criminal Matters Amendment Act 1998 brings some sanity (but only some) to the 
defence of insanity’ (1999) 12 SACJ 41 at 41. Releases were, therefore, few and far 
between. Also, see S v Pedro 2015 (1) SACR 41 (WCC) at para [85]. 
30 S v Pedro op cit (n29) at para [85]. Also, see s 47(4)(a) of the Mental Health Care 
Act 17 of 2002 which provides that an application for discharge may not be brought 
within 12 months of a previous application for discharge having been dismissed. 
Also see De Vos CC case op cit (n1) at para [36], footnote 41 where it is confirmed 
that an application for discharge can only be brought once every 12 months.
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to follow the trial proceedings to the extent that he is discharged from 
treatment as state patient, his trial may resume.31 
During an application for discharge from treatment as state patient 
the judge may, rather than granting or denying this application, 
reclassify the accused and order that his treatment continues on an 
involuntary mental health care basis. Below, detention as a state patient 
is contrasted with detention as an involuntary mental health care user.
2.3.2 Involuntary mental health care user (s 77(6)(a)(ii) order)
Involuntary mental health care services are rendered to a person 
who is unable, because of his mental health status, to take an informed 
decision about the need for treatment and who refuses same, but needs 
it for their own protection or to protect others.32 
Section 77(6)(a)(ii) provides that an unfit accused found to have 
committed an act other than the violent acts set out above33 or found 
not to have committed the act in question,34 must be detained in an 
institution as an involuntary mental health care user in terms of the 
Mental Health Care Act.35
31 Section 77(7) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. The only requirement is 
that the accused must, at the point when the proceedings are resumed, be able to 
follow the proceedings. See Kruger Hiemstra Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses op cit 
(n7) 231 and S v Leeuw 1987 (3) SA 97 (A). See Louw op cit (n12) 43. Also, see Cassim 
op cit (n16) 20. See further Du Toit op cit (n6) 13-3, who adds that the trial rarely 
continues if and when an accused regains his ability to stand trial. Also, see Joubert 
op cit (n5) 252.
32 Section 1 of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002.
33 Acts involving serious violence such as murder, culpable homicide or rape. See 
s 77 (6)(a)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
34 The finding as to whether the unfit accused committed the act in question, is arrived 
at during the trial on the facts. See s 77(6)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 
1977. 
35 Section 77(6)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 reads: 
 ‘(ii)  where the court finds that the accused has committed an offence other than 
one contemplated in subparagraph (i) or that he or she has not committed any 
offence—
 (aa) be admitted to and detained in an institution stated in the order as if he or 
she were an involuntary mental health care user contemplated in s 37 of the Mental 
Health Care Act, and if the court so directs after the accused has pleaded to the 
charge, the accused shall not be entitled under s 106(4) to be acquitted or to be 
convicted in respect of the charge in question.’
 Also see s 37 of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002. See further Louw op cit 
(n12) 43. See further Du Toit op cit (n6) 13-7. These persons cannot be detained 
as state patients as only accused persons who are found to have committed violent 
offences can be so detained in terms of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002. 
Also, see De Vos NO v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development; In Re: 
Snyders v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2015 (1) SACR 18 
(WCC) (hereinafter the ‘De Vos HC case’) at para [9]. 
The unfit accused in the South African Criminal Justice System: 
From automatic detention to unconditional release 65
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
The mental health status of an involuntary mental health care user is 
reviewed periodically.36 Once it is established that involuntary mental 
health care is no longer needed, the user may be discharged.37 It is 
easier to secure the discharge of an involuntary mental health care 
user than to secure the discharge of a state patient.38 The mental 
health review board established under the Mental Health Care Act may 
further order the discharge of involuntary mental health care users.39 
An accused who received involuntary care by order of the criminal 
court, and who is discharged from such care by the mental health 
facility, will most probably be deemed to have regained his fitness to 
stand trial. His criminal trial may continue at this stage.40
2.4 Conclusion
Section 77(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act leads to the inevitable 
detention of an unfit accused as either a state patient or an involuntary 
mental health care user in terms of the Mental Health Care Act.  
State patients must be detained in prison or a psychiatric hospital for 
an unspecified and potentially very long period of time. Imprisoning 
state patients is concerning as mental health resources in prisons 
36 Section 37(1) of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002 provides for a review of the 
accused’s mental health status six months after the commencement of the treatment 
and thereafter every 12 months.
37 Sections 37 and 38 of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002. Section 37 provides 
for the discharge of the involuntary mental health care user if, during the periodic 
review, the Review Board is of the view that the user should be discharged. 
Section 38 allows for the head of the health establishment to discharge the user if 
he is of the view that the user no longer suffers from a mental illness. If the user is 
willing to receive further treatment, the user will forthwith be treated as a voluntary 
mental health care user. Section 38(2) of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002 
read with s 25 thereof. If the user is not willing to receive further treatment and 
the head of the health establishment is satisfied that this person no longer suffers 
from a mental illness, such person must be discharged and the high court must be 
informed of such discharge. Section 38(3) read with s 37(6) of the Mental Health 
Care Act 17 of 2002.
38 Compare s 37 and s 47 of the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002. Also see S v Siko 
2010 (2) SACR 406 (ECB) at para [8].
39 Section 37(5) of the Mental Health Care Act. The Registrar of the high court must be 
notified of such discharge. See s 37(6) of the Mental Health Care Act.
40 S v Pedro op cit (n29) at para [114]. The court, however, expressed concern 
about the fact that there does not appear to be any legislative procedure which 
ensures that the Director of Public Prosecutions receives periodic reports as to the 
mental health status of a person who has been referred for detention in terms of 
sub-para (ii) of s 77(6)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. In this particular 
case an accused person ordered by the court to be treated as an involuntary mental 
health care user was released after two months of being so detained. Also see 
s 77(7) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
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are scarce41 making treatment of the unfit accused’s mental illness 
unlikely. With this in mind, the purpose of detention of a state patient 
in prison, becomes unclear. It is concerning that an unfit accused 
found not to have committed the act in question, must be detained as 
an involuntary mental health care user under s 77(6)(a)(ii). No option 
of conditional or unconditional release exists. 
The constitutionality of imprisonment and hospitalisation of a state 
patient as provided for in s 77(6)(a)(i) and the automatic detention of 
an unfit accused as an involuntary mental health care user under 
s 77(6)(a)(ii) has far-reaching consequences and impacts on the 
accused’s right to freedom and security of the person, especially since 
detention is not the consequence of a finding of guilt.42 The court’s 
lack of discretion under s 77(6) means the individual circumstances 
of the accused, such as the treatability of his mental condition, 
cannot be considered when deciding on the manner of detention 
of the accused.43 Such lack of discretion could lead to the arbitrary 
deprivation of freedom of the unfit accused.44 
The constitutional validity of s 77(6)(a)(i) and (ii) were challenged in 
the Constitutional Court in the De Vos matter discussed below.
3  The De Vos judgment as impetus behind the Criminal 
Procedure Amendment Act 
3.1 Introduction
The judgment deals with important issues that warrant in-depth 
discussion. For purposes of this contribution, however, the discussion 
of the Constitutional Court judgment that follows only touches 
upon selected aspects of the courts finding with regard to the 
41 Evidence was presented to the court that prisons do not have facilities to provide 
psychological services to detainees with mental illness or intellectual disabilities. 
This evidence was uncontested by the Minister of Health in the high court. See 
De Vos HC case op cit (n36) at para [43].
42 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [20]. Even though a trial on the facts is held 
subsequent to a finding of unfitness, such trial is not aimed at proving the guilt or 
innocence of an unfit accused but aids the court in determining what actus reus, if 
any, they have committed. See S v Sithole op cit (n11) at 315I.
43 The high court in the De Vos matter expressed concern over the fact that s 77(6)(a) 
does not allow a court to make an order with due regard to the individual 
circumstances of the accused, including whether the accused poses a danger to 
society De Vos HC case supra (n36) at para [49]. Also see De Vos CC case supra (n1) 
at para [7].
44 Khan op cit (n18) 45.
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unconstitutionality of s 77(6)(a)(i) and (ii).45 These issues include the 
peremptory nature of s 77(6)(a) and whether the lack of discretion 
by the court under s 77(6) leads to a violation of the accused’s right 
to freedom and security of the person as provided for in s 12 of 
the Constitution.46 Though the discussion is focused mainly on the 
Constitutional Court judgment, reference is made to the finding of the 
Western Cape High Court where pertinent.
3.2 Facts of the case
This case concerned two accused persons living with intellectual 
disabilities, one accused of murder and the other of rape.47 Both were 
found unfit to stand trial.48 The matters were consolidated because of 
the similarity in issues in these two cases before the court. According 
to s 77(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act at the time, both accused 
had to be detained as state patients in terms of s 47 of the Mental 
Health Care Act. This is because of the seriousness of the charges 
against them, provided it was found that they committed the act 
in question.49 Discharge from such detention is only possible by 
order of a judge in chambers once an improvement in the accused’s 
mental state is observed.50 Due to the nature of an intellectual 
45 For a detailed case discussion on the De Vos judgment, see Khan op cit (n18) 39-46. 
See further D Janse van Rensburg A Constitutional Analysis of the Court’s (lack of) 
Discretion in Terms of Section 77(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 LLM 
(University of Pretoria) (2015).
46 Section 12(1)(a) of the Constitution states that ‘everyone has the right to freedom 
and security of the person, which includes the right – (a) not to be deprived of 
freedom arbitrarily or without just cause’.
47 The first accused, Mr Stuurman, was accused of stabbing a 14-year-old girl to death 
when he himself was only 14 years old. He sustained a head injury at the age of 5, 
which left him with a severe ‘mental’ disability. The second accused, Mr Snyders 
who was born with Down’s syndrome and had cognitive impairments, was accused 
of raping a girl who, at the time of the trial was 11 years old. The rape was alleged 
to have taken place some 5 to 6 years prior to the trial. 
48 Mr Stuurman was sent for observation by the Oudtshoorn regional court and the 
finding was that he was unfit to stand trial – although the three psychiatrists differed 
in their reasons for this finding, the finding was unanimous. See De Vos CC case 
supra (n1) at para [6]. The second accused, Mr Snyders, was sent for observation by 
the Blue Down’s Magistrates Court and was found unfit to stand trial. The report 
indicated that he had moderate mental retardation. De Vos CC case supra (n1) at 
para [23].
49 Section 77(6)(a)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. The matter came before 
the court on special review since concern was raised about proof that the accused 
was actually involved in the offence of which he stood accused. 
50 The form used for the application for discharge (form MHCA 30 in the regulations 
to the Mental Health Care Act R233, GG 24384, 14 February 2003, pp92-96) requires 
the applicant to indicate the prognosis of the accused. See s 47(3) of the Mental 
Health Care Act 17 of 2002. Intellectual disability as such is not treatable.
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disability, no improvement is possible; therefore, these accused 
persons faced indefinite detention.51 The validity of s 77(6)(a)(i) and 
(ii) was challenged in the Western Cape High Court52 and found to 
be unconstitutional.53 The matter was referred to the Constitutional 
Court for confirmation of invalidity of s 77(6)(a)(i) and (ii) as required 
by s 167(5) of the Constitution. 54 The Constitutional Court did not 
confirm the declaration of invalidity handed down by the high court 
but did indeed find s 77(6)(a)(i) and (ii) wanting as discussed below.
3.3 Peremptory nature of s 77(6)
Section 77(6) states that if an accused is found to have committed a 
serious offence contemplated in s 77(6)(a)(i) ‘the court shall direct 
that the accused…be detained in a psychiatric hospital or prison 
pending the decision of a judge in chambers’. In terms of s 77(6)(a)
(ii), it is stated that if it is established, on a balance of probabilities, 
that the accused committed a minor offence or did not commit any 
offence, ‘the court shall direct that the accused…be admitted to and 
detained in an institution’. The applicant argued that the use of the 
word ‘shall’ in s  77(6) is indicative of its peremptory nature.55 The 
Constitutional Court, relying on the principle of statutory interpretation 
that words should be given their ordinary meaning, agreed with the 
applicant56 and found that s 77(6)(a) is indeed peremptory in that 
it compels the court to order the incarceration (of a state patient) 
or institutionalisation of an unfit accused regardless of any other 
51 The psychiatrists included this concern in their report after finding Mr Snyders, 
who was accused of rape, unfit to stand trial: ‘As the alleged offence occurred some 
5 years ago it does raise the possibility that he may not be dealt with fairly with 
respect to the facts of the case. The court should be advised that consequently to 
declare him a state patient [as contemplated by s 77(6)(a)(i) will consign him to 
indefinite institutionalisation as his cognition will never improve. Unless there are 
other reports of inappropriate behaviour committed by him in the community this 
may not be a fair or appropriate disposal.’ De Vos HC supra (n36) at para [22].
52 De Vos HC case supra (n36) at para [2].
53 De Vos HC case supra (n36) at para [72]. This order was suspended for 24 months to 
enable the legislature to cure the invalidity.
54 See De Vos CC case supra (n1).
55 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [16].
56 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [18].
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fact or circumstance.57 The Constitutional Court found that s 77(6)(a) 
deprived the court of exercising judicial discretion.58 
Having found that s 77(6) is peremptory, the court had to consider 
whether the detention of mentally ill accused persons in terms of 
s 77(6)(a) was arbitrary and without just cause so as to constitute a 
violation of the constitutional right to freedom and security of the 
person.59
3.4  The accused’s right to freedom and security of the person
The Constitutional Court emphasised that deprivation of liberty has to 
be justifiable from both a substantive and a procedural point of view.60 
The substantive element entails that detention must not be arbitrary 
and that the purpose or reason for the deprivation of liberty must be 
just.61
Whether deprivation is ‘just’ depends on the circumstances of 
each case.62 With regard to the procedural element, the procedure 
followed to achieve the deprivation of liberty has to be fair63 with 
satisfactory safeguards built into the process. Substantive fairness does 
not presuppose procedural fairness.64
In order to determine whether the deprivation of liberty is just, 
it has to be established whether there is a connection between the 
57 The Constitutional Court confirmed in De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [19] that the 
wording of s 77(6) cannot be interpreted in any way other than that it is peremptory 
and does not leave the court with a discretion to make appropriate orders in a 
particular case. Also, see De Vos HC case supra (n36) at para [11] where the lack of 
discretion for orders pertaining to the unfit accused is indicated. 
58 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [19].
59 Section 12 of the Constitution. Also, see De Vos HC case supra (n36) at para [38]. 
It was argued on behalf of the accused that these provisions violated a mentally ill 
accused person’s right to equality, dignity as well as freedom and security of person. 
These rights are protected in ss 9, 10 and 12, respectively, of the Constitution. See 
De Vos HC case supra (n36) at para [33]. It was also contested because it violates 
the rights of children in terms of s 28(2) of the Constitution. As already stated, the 
position of children and thus the part of the judgment dealing with the position 
of children will not be discussed here. For a discussion on the issues relating to 
children, see Janse van Rensburg op cit (n45) 43-48.
60 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at paras [23]-[25].
61 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [25]. The court, at para [26], referring to the 
matter of De Lange v Smuts NO 1998 (3) SA (CC) 785, stated that there must be a 
rational connection between the deprivation of the liberty on the one hand and 
some subjectively determinable purpose. If no such link exists, then deprivation of 
freedom is not just. Even where such a link does exist, however, it is important to 
ensure that the reason for the deprivation must be just.
62 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [28].
63 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at paras [24], [25].
64 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [24].
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deprivation of liberty and the objective of such detention, namely 
to provide treatment to the accused, alternatively to secure the 
safety of the accused or the community.65 The state argued that the 
objective of detaining the unfit accused is to prevent the accused from 
harming himself or the public, to prevent stigmatisation by other 
members of the community and further to provide treatment, care and 
rehabilitation to the accused.66 Dealing with the prevention of harm 
that the accused could cause, the state argued in the high court that 
mentally ill persons may pose a danger to themselves and society.67 
It was acknowledged that there might be circumstances in which 
detention of mentally ill persons is justified and that such detention 
in those circumstances serves a legitimate purpose.68 The high court, 
however, warned against an assumption that all persons with mental 
illness are dangerous especially since s 77(6)(a) does not require, or 
even permit, the court to enquire into the potential danger that the 
accused may pose to society.69 The Constitutional Court agreed and 
added that s 77(6)(a) perpetuated stereotyping in that it nurtured the 
perception that all persons with mental illnesses are dangerous.70 The 
assumption of dangerousness is therefore not an acceptable reason 
or objective for depriving the accused of his liberty. The acceptability 
of the argument that the objective with the deprivation of liberty is 
to provide treatment to the unfit accused, is dealt with later in this 
65 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [31].
66 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [32].
67 De Vos HC case supra (n36) at paras [41], [46], [47]. The respondents (Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development) argued that the deprivation of freedom 
in the case of persons detained because they are mentally ill ‘gives effect to 
legitimate governmental objectives, which were identified by the respondents as 
being the following: (a) An accused person with a mental illness, who is found to 
have committed a serious or violent act, poses a potential danger to society. The 
community must accordingly be protected from such persons and the State must 
fulfil its obligation to provide safety and security for the people of South Africa. 
(b) The DPP further contended that s 77(6)(a) is “designed primarily to protect the 
interest of the accused person” and that it is necessary ‘to protect the mentally ill 
person from danger to him, as well as the public from possible danger from the 
accused person.’ (at para [46]).
68 De Vos HC case supra (n36) at para [48]. Also see De Vos CC case op supra (n1) at 
para [7].
69 De Vos HC case supra (n36) at para [49] reads: ‘It is equally well-recognised, 
however, that not every person with a mental illness or mental defect is a danger 
to society or requires to be detained in an institution. This is so because there 
are varying degrees of mental illness and various types of mental disability, and 
institutionalisation is not invariably required or indeed appropriate. And herein lies 
the rub, because s 77(6)(a) does not require, or even permit, the court to enquire 
into either the potential danger to society posed by the accused person or the 
individual needs or circumstances of such person.’
70 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [56].
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contribution where the constitutionality of detention under s 77(6)(a)(i) 
and (ii) is discussed.
With regard to procedural fairness, the court considered the trial on 
the facts as a mechanism built into the process to ensure such fairness 
when depriving an unfit accused of his liberty under s 77(6). The 
court found, however, that the trial on the facts is not a satisfactory 
safeguard against arbitrary detention since the result of the trial, 
regardless of the finding, was inevitably detention.71 It appears that 
the deprivation of liberty of the unfit accused under s 77(6) does not 
meet the substantive or the procedural requirements to justify such 
deprivation. Consequently, the automatic detention of an unfit accused 
under s 77(6) amounts to arbitrary detention.
The Constitutional Court confirmed that such arbitrary detention 
violates the unfit accused’s right to freedom and security of the 
person, equality and dignity. The right to dignity is a value central to 
interpreting the right to freedom and security of the person.72 A person 
with a mental illness has the right to not be deemed dangerous due 
to the mere presence of the mental illness and to not be deprived 
of liberty on the basis thereof. This is in line with the constitutional 
duty to promote the equality of, especially, persons disadvantaged by 
past practices73 including accused persons with mental illnesses or 
intellectual disabilities.74
The Constitutional Court gave due consideration to international 
law75 and in particular the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities76 which specifically states the ‘existence 
of a disability shall in no case justify the deprivation of liberty’.77 
The court reiterated that persons with disabilities cannot simply be 
removed from society for the mere fact that they have a mental illness 
or intellectual disability.78
The court considered s 36 of the Constitution (the limitation clause) 
to determine whether the limitation on the unfit accused’s s 12 right 
 
71 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [57]. The trial on the facts is the process during 
which it is determined whether the unfit accused committed the crime in question
72 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [46].
73 Section 7 of the Constitution. Also see De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [56].
74 Accused persons with mental illness or intellectual disabilities have been historically 
disadvantaged and discriminated against De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [46].
75 Section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution requires courts to consider international law 
when interpreting the Bill of Rights. 
76 United Nations Convention on Persons with Disabilities and Optional Protocol 
(A/RES/61/106) adopted on 13 December 2006.
77 Article 14(1)(b) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities op cit (n76).
78 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [30].
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could be justified. The court found that such limitation was not 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom.79 
Having established that arbitrary detention of unfit accused persons 
violates such accused’s right to freedom and security of the person, 
the court had to consider the constitutionality of s 77(6)(a)(i) and (ii) 
which facilitates such detention.
3.4.1 Detention of state patients (s 77(6)(a)(i))
3.4.1.1 Detention in prison
The court found that s 77(6)(a)(i) in so far as it mandates the 
imprisonment of an unfit accused based on resources shortages alone, 
is inconsistent with the Constitution and accordingly invalid. The 
declaration of invalidity was suspended for 24 months to allow the 
legislature to remedy the invalidity.80
The court did not accept the respondent’s argument that the aim 
with or reason for imprisonment of an unfit accused is to provide care 
and treatment to the accused and to facilitate therapeutic remedies for 
the accused.81 The court rejected this reasoning based on evidence 
presented to the court that prisons do not have facilities to provide 
psychological services to detainees with mental illness or intellectual 
disabilities.82 The lack of facilities in prison means the intended 
objective with detention, namely, treatment, is unachievable. The 
court emphasised that the aim with imprisoning the unfit accused is 
not punishment.83 There is consequently no rational link between the 
deprivation of liberty by way of detention in prison and the objective 
of providing treatment to such an accused. Detention of state patients 
in prison for treatment is therefore unjust. 
The Constitutional Court further reiterated that imprisonment of 
an unfit accused violates the accused’s right to dignity and that it 
reinforces the stigma and marginalisation of accused persons with 
mental illness.84 Accused persons, who are not considered dangerous, 
should not have their freedom limited in a manner that amounts to 
degrading punishment as this violates their dignity and breaches their 
right not to be deprived of their freedom without just cause.85
79 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [59]. 
80 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [65].
81 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at paras [42], [43].
82 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [43]. Also see De Vos HC case supra (n36) at para [42]. 
This evidence was uncontested by the Minister of Health in the high court.
83 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [39].
84 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [46].
85 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [46].
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The court found that imprisonment should only be used as a ‘stop-
gap’ measure where an unfit accused awaits availability of a bed in a 
hospital for treatment and where the court believes that the accused 
poses a danger to himself and others if released awaiting such 
availability.86 Where there is no threat of harm, the court should be 
allowed to craft a fitting order that allows for the outpatient treatment 
of the accused by, for example, extending the bail conditions, or any 
other appropriate order pending availability of a bed in a psychiatric 
hospital.87 
3.4.1.2 Detention in psychiatric hospital
The Constitutional Court found that detaining a state patient in a 
psychiatric hospital88 is permissible because the accused is properly 
assessed during the s 79 fitness assessment to establish whether he has 
a mental illness and is in need of treatment.89 Such detention serves 
the objective of care and treatment, and therefore, justifies infringing 
the accused’s liberty.90
86 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [47].
87 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [63] where the court stated: ‘Section 77(6)(a)(i) 
operates rationally subject to certain qualifications. Imprisonment should only be 
available to accused persons who pose a serious danger to society or themselves. 
If an accused person does not pose a serious danger to society or themselves, 
then resources alone cannot dictate that an accused person be placed in prison. 
If  resources alone require an accused person to be kept in prison, then to this 
extent, section 77(6)(a)(i) is inconsistent with the Constitution and is invalid. 
If resources are significantly constrained such that a bed in a psychiatric hospital 
is unavailable, then a presiding officer should be able to craft an appropriate order 
that encompasses treating the accused as an outpatient, for example, by extending 
the bail conditions, or any other appropriate order pending the availability of a 
bed in a psychiatric hospital.’ An order similar to that provided for in s 35(1)( f ) 
of the Constitution or 79(2)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 should 
be considered. Section 35(1)( f ) of the Constitution states: ‘(1) Everyone who is 
arrested for allegedly committing an offence has the right— ( f ) to be released 
from detention if the interests of justice permit, subject to reasonable conditions.’ 
Section 79(2)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 states: ‘The court may 
make the following orders after the enquiry referred to in subsection (1) has been 
conducted- (i) postpone the case for such periods referred to in paragraph (a), as the 
court may from time to time determine; (ii) refer the accused at the request of the 
prosecutor to the court referred to in section 77 (6) which has jurisdiction to try the 
case; (iii) make any other order it deems fit regarding the custody of the accused; 
or (iv) any other order.’ 
88 In terms of s 77(6)(a)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, which deals with 
persons accused of serious crimes involving violence.
89 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [38]. The high court found that such hospitalisation 
is unconstitutional. See Janse van Rensburg op cit (n45) 53. 
90 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [31] the court reiterated the importance of a 
rational connection between the deprivation of liberty and the objective with which 
it is done. 
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The court found that the safeguards built into s 47 of the Mental 
Health Care Act regarding discharge measures, are sufficient to protect 
the accused’s rights91 and ensures that such person is not detained for 
longer than necessary.92
3.4.2  Detention of involuntary mental health care users  
(s 77(6)(a)(i))
Since s 77(6)(a)(ii) mandates the institutionalisation of all unfit accused 
persons regardless of whether they require treatment or pose a danger 
to themselves or others, it is inconsistent with the Constitution.93
The state argued that the reason for detaining an involuntary mental 
health care user as an accused found not to have committed the act in 
question or found to have committed a non -violent offence is because 
such an accused needs treatment.94 The Constitution rejected this 
argument and the court pointed out that the objective of treatment 
alone cannot justify institutionalisation as this fails to appreciate that 
mental illness is complex.95 It was stressed that not all mental illnesses 
are treatable (such as Down’s syndrome) and that institutionalisation 
of a person with this condition would not serve the purpose of 
treatment as the condition will not improve.96 The court stressed that 
the presence of a mental illness or intellectual disability per se cannot 
justify the deprivation of liberty97 in the form of institutionalisation, 
nor is the mentally ill person’s contact with the criminal justice system 
a justifiable reason for institutionalisation.98 
The court considered the criteria set out on the Mental Health Care 
Act for involuntary care treatment and rehabilitation services and noted 
that s 77(6)(a) effectively creates a pathway for an accused through the 
criminal justice system to be admitted as an involuntary mental health 
care user where they would not have met the criteria had they not 
91 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at paras [35]-[38].
92 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [38].
93 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [66].
94 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [53].
95 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [55]. This finding ties in with the high court’s 
observation that there are varying degrees of mental illness and intellectual 
disability and institutionalisation is not always required or appropriate. See De Vos 
HC case supra (n36) at para [49].
96 The objective of treatment in itself is therefore not sufficient to justify an infringement 
of a person’s liberty. See De Vos CC case op cit (n1) at para 55.
97 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [56].
98 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [57].
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been in the criminal justice system.99 The court held that this state of 
affairs results in accused persons more readily being institutionalised 
under the Criminal Procedure Act without the ordinary safeguards of 
the Mental Health Care Act.100
As stated, the court found s 77(6)(a)(ii) inconsistent with the 
Constitution. As a remedy, the court ordered that s 77(6)(a)(ii) should, 
from the date of the order and pending amendment by the legislature, 
read as follows:
‘(ii) where the court finds that the accused has committed an offence 
other than one contemplated in subparagraph (i) or that he or she has not 
committed any offence— (aa) be admitted to and detained in an institution 
stated in the order as if he or she were an involuntary mental health care user 
contemplated in section 37 of the Mental Health Care Act (bb) be released 
subject to such conditions as the court considers appropriate; or (cc) be 
released unconditionally.’101
3.5 Conclusion
The Constitutional Court did not confirm the order of invalidity of 
s 77(6)(a)(i) and (ii) as determined by the high court.102 The Court did, 
however, find that s 77(6)(a)(i) is inconsistent with the Constitution 
in as far is it provides for the compulsory imprisonment of an adult 
accused person.103 It further held that s 77(6)(a)(ii) is inconsistent with 
the Constitution and suggested new wording of this section104 which 
was eventually incorporated into the Amendment Act.105 Changes 
to these sections are necessary so as to not perpetuate violations 
of the accused’s right to freedom and security of the person which 
99 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [54] the court explains that involuntary admission 
under the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002 is only permissible if ‘any delay in 
providing care, treatment and rehabilitation services or admission may result in 
the— (i) death or irreversible harm to the health of the user; (ii) user inflicting 
serious harm to himself or herself or others; or (iii) user causing serious damage 
to or loss of property belonging to him or her or others.’ The court then observes 
that ‘without a court order, the accused would not be able to be institutionalised 
involuntarily unless (i), (ii) or (iii) above can be established. Thus, absent one of the 
above criteria, if an accused has committed no offence, institutionalisation cannot 
follow under the Mental Health Care Act. In effect, then, accused persons are more 
readily institutionalised under the Criminal Procedure Act without the ordinary 
safeguards prescribed by the Mental Health Care Act.’
100 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [54]. 
101 De Vos HC case supra (n36) at para [69.4].
102 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [69.1]. Also see Janse van Rensburg op cit (n45) 56.
103 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [69].
104 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [69].
105 Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 4 of 2017.
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materialised through the predetermined and mandatory outcome106 
prescribed by s 77(6).
The wording of s 77(6) deprived the court of using its discretion 
regarding an appropriate order having due regard to the facts of the 
individual case.107 This lack of discretion could lead to injustice where 
a rule is applied mechanically without due regard to the uniqueness 
of each case. In the context of s 77(6), such injustice is the automatic 
detention of an unfit accused regardless of whether the unfit accused 
is in need of mental health care treatment or whether their condition is 
treatable, whether they committed an offence or not or pose a danger 
to themselves or others or whether less restrictive alternatives for 
treatment exist. Importantly, the De Vos judgment acknowledges that 
not all persons with mental illness are dangerous and thus for that 
reason only need to be detained. This acknowledgement debunks the 
assumption of dangerousness that was routinely associated with mental 
illness.108
The court’s acknowledgement that not all mental illness is treatable, 
confirms that it is unjustifiable to detain all unfit accused persons 
for treatment. In certain instances, such as the case with intellectual 
disabilities, detention simply does not serve the purpose of treatment 
as the condition is simply not treatable.109 A fitting order for an unfit 
accused who poses no danger to themselves or others might well be 
conditional discharge with the view of securing outpatient treatment. 
Section 77(6), however, does not allow the court to consider the nature 
of the illness or desirability of inpatient versus outpatient treatment. 
The need for discretion when making the s 77(6) orders is imperative 
since judicial discretion has a very important role to play here to 
ensure justice.110
106 De Vos HC case supra (n36) at para [49].
107 De Vos HC case supra (n36) at para [49].
108 Unfit accused persons were detained not because they committed an offence or 
because they were dangerous, but merely because they had a mental illness. This 
practice perpetuated the stigmatisation of mentally ill persons as dangerous. 
109 Khan op cit (n18) 44.
110 De Vos HC case supra (n36) at para [50] where the court quoted from the judgment 
of Ngcobo J, writing for the majority in Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 (4) SA 222 (CC) at para [119] 
where it was stated: ‘The importance of judicial discretion cannot be gainsaid. 
Discretion permits judicial officers to take into account the need for tailoring their 
decisions to the unique facts and circumstances of particular cases. There are many 
circumstances where the mechanical application of a rule may result in an injustice. 
What is required is individualised justice, that is, justice that is appropriately 
tailored to the needs of the individual case. It is only through discretion that the 
goal of individualised justice can be achieved. Individualised justice is essential to 
the proper administration of justice.’
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The De Vos judgment highlights the necessity to expand the orders 
available to a court when finding an accused unfit to stand trial. The 
Amendment Act does just that. A discussion of the amended s 77(6)(a)(i) 
and (ii) follows.
4 Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 4 of 2017
4.1 Introduction
This Act which came into force on 29 June 2017 seeks to amend ss 77 
to 79 of the Criminal Procedure Act. The aim of amending s 77 is to 
provide the courts with a wider range of options regarding orders 
to be issued where an accused is found incapable of understanding 
criminal proceedings.111 This is achieved by, inter alia, replacing the 
word ‘shall’ in s 77(6)(a) with ‘may’. The Amendment Act gives effect 
to the De Vos judgment and aims to remedy the unconstitutionality of 
s 77(6)(a)(i) and (ii). The specific amendments to s 77(6)(a)(i) and (ii) 
are explained below. 
Before the amendments to s 77(6)(a)(i) and (ii) are discussed, it is 
important to note that the Amendment Act brought about a change in 
terminology. ‘Intellectual disability’112 replaces ‘mental defect’ as the 
more acceptable term and one used in the mental health profession.113
4.2  Amendment of s 77(6)(a)(i) (charged with offence involving 
violence)
Previously under s 77(6)(a)(i), the court had no option but to order 
the detention in prison or a psychiatric hospital of an unfit accused 
charged with and found to have committed a violent act. Since the 
court in the De Vos judgment found the imprisonment of state patients 
until released by an order of a judge in chambers unconstitutional, 
the option of imprisonment now falls away. Detention in hospital is 
still permissible. The court may also order detention where the court 
111 The preamble to the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 4 of 2017. 
112 Section 1 of the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 4 of 2017 amends s 77(1) to 
this effect. Section 2 of the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 4 of 2017 amends 
s 78 to incorporate the more acceptable term of ‘intellectual disability’. Section 3 of 
the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 4 of 2017 amends s 79 with regard to the 
substitution of the term ‘mental defect’ with ‘intellectual disability’. 
113 American Psychiatric Association The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-V) released in 2013 at 33 refers to intellectual disability rather 
than mental retardation and defines intellectual disability as follows: ‘Intellectual 
disability (intellectual developmental disorder) is a disorder with onset during 
the developmental period that includes both intellectual and adaptive functioning 
deficits in conceptual, social, and practical domains’. Three criteria as set out in the 
DSM-V must be met before this diagnosis can be made. 
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considers it to be necessary in the public interest.114 The table below 
illustrates the difference between the orders available to the court 
immediately before the enactment of the Amendment Act and the 
orders available thereafter.115 116 117 118 119
Orders available to the court under s 77(6)(a)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 prior 
to amendment
Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 4 
of 2017
(aa) Detained as state patient in 
psychiatric hospital or a prison 
pending the decision of a judge in 
chambers in terms of s 47 of the Mental 
Health Care Act, 2002115
(aa) detained as state patient in 
psychiatric hospital pending the 
decision of a judge in chambers in 
terms of s 47 of the Mental Health Care 
Act, 2002;116  
OR
(bb) temporary detention in a 
correctional facility permissible if 
accused awaiting availability of bed in 
psychiatric hospital and if he or she 
poses a danger to self or others.117  
OR
(cc) admitted to and detained in a 
designated health establishment 
stated in the order as if he or she were 
an involuntary mental health care user 
contemplated in s 37 of the Mental 
Health Care Act, 2002;118 
OR
(dd) Released subject to such conditions 
as the court considers appropriate;119  
The options available to the court under s 77(6)(a)(i) are expanded 
significantly to include less restrictive alternatives for purposes of 
114 This was provided for in s 77(6)(a)(i) prior to its amendment as well. This will most 
probably be the case where an accused poses a danger to society at large.
115 Section 77(6)(a)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 prior to the amendment. 
Under the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 prior to this amendment, an unfit 
accused charged with and found to have committed a violent act faced automatic 
detention.
116 Section 1(b) of the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 4 of 2017 amends 
s 77(6)(a)(i)(aa) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. The Amendment Act 
amends s 77(6)(a)(i) to remove the option for such an accused to be detained in 
prison indefinitely after a finding of unfitness. An unfit accused charged with and 
found to have committed a violent act can no longer be detained indefinitely as a 
state patient in prison but only as such in a psychiatric hospital. Temporary detention 
is however permissible as per s 1(b) of the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 4 
of 2017 which amends s 77(6)(a)(i)(bb) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
117 Section 1(b) of the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 4 of 2017 amends 
s 77(6)(a)(i)(bb) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
118 Section 77(6)(a)(i)(cc) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 as amended by the 
Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 4 of 2017.  Involuntary care is a less restrictive 
form of detention under the Mental Health Care Act.
119 Section 77(6)(a)(i)(dd) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 as amended by the 
Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 4 of 2017.
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treatment of the unfit accused. The option of conditional release120 
leaves room for outpatient treatment. This accused may not, however, 
be released unconditionally.
The provision for the temporary detention of a state patient in 
a correctional health facility of a prison while awaiting a bed in a 
psychiatric hospital gives effect to the ‘stop-gap’ measure as proposed 
by the Constitutional Court in the De Vos judgment.121
4.3  Amendment of s 77(6)(a)(ii) accused (charged with minor 
offence)
Under the Criminal Procedure Act prior to the 2017 amendment, an 
accused who was found to have committed an offence other than 
a violent offence referred to in s 77(6)(a)(i) or found not to have 
committed any offence at all had to be detained as an involuntary 
mental health care user in terms of the Mental Health Care Act.122 
This option remains in the Amendment Act. However, it is no longer 
the only order available to the court as set out in the table below.123124
 
Options available to the court under s 77(6)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 prior 
to amendment
Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 4 
of 2017
(aa) Be admitted to and detained in an 
institution stated in the order as if he or 
she were an involuntary mental health 
care user contemplated in s 37 of the 
Mental Health Care Act, 2002.
(aa) Be admitted to and detained in a 
designated health establishment stated 
in the order as if he or she were an 
involuntary mental health care user 
contemplated in s 37 of the Mental 
Health Care Act, 2002; 
OR
(bb) released subject to such conditions 
as the court considers appropriate;123  
OR
(cc) released unconditionally.124
120 Section 77(6)(a)(i)(dd) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 as amended by the 
Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 4 of 2017.
121 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [47].
122 Section 77(6)(a)(ii)(aa) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 prior to amendment 
by the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 4 of 2917.
123 Section 77(6)(a)(ii)(bb) inserted by s 1(b) of the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 
4 of 2017.
124 Section 77(6)(a)(ii)(cc) inserted by s 1(b) of the Criminal Procedure Amendment 
Act 4 of 2017.  In the Criminal Procedure Amendment Bill [B2-2017], the proposed 
amendment entailed that unconditional release will only be possible if the court 
finds that the accused did not commit the offence at all.  This proviso does not 
appear in the Amendment Act 4 of 2017.  Unconditional release is therefore 
apparently not only reserved for cases where the unfit accused is found not have 
committed the act in question.
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These options of conditional and unconditional release give effect to 
the proposed reading-in as suggested by the Constitutional Court with 
regard to s 77(6)(a)(ii).125
4.4 Comments on the Amendment Act
The Amendment Act strengthens the unfit accused person’s right to 
freedom and security of the person. This is clear from the removal of 
the option to detain a state patient in prison for purposes of treatment 
until he is released by order of a judge in chambers. In addition, 
persons who previously could only be detained as state patients may 
now be detained and treated as involuntary mental health care users. 
It is easier to secure the discharge of an involuntary mental health 
care user than that of a state patient. State patients may now even be 
released conditionally. The expanded options available to the court 
enables the court to order treatment for the unfit accused in less 
restrictive ways based on the individual circumstances of the case 
including the nature of the mental illness of the accused. In the case of 
an accused with an intellectual disability, for example, the conditions 
for release may include sessions at a rehabilitation centre rather than 
a psychiatric hospital as a more suitable place that can provide the 
proper care and/or treatment for the particular condition.126 Probably 
the most drastic amendment of s 77(6) is the option of unconditional 
release of an accused found to have committed an offence other than 
a violent offence or found not to have committed any offence at all.127 
This approach recognises that not all mental illnesses are treatable 
and not all persons with mental illnesses are dangerous and for these 
reasons only need to be detained.
The possibilities of conditional or unconditional release as introduced 
into the law by the Amendment Act transforms the trial on the facts 
into an adequate procedural safeguard against arbitrary detention. 
The trial on the facts was not an adequate safeguard against arbitrary 
detention since the result of the trial, regardless of the finding on 
whether the unfit accused committed the act in question, was inevitably 
detention. This trial previously only served to determine whether the 
125 See the amended s 77(6)(a)(ii) as set out in De Vos CC case supra (n1) at paras [39], 
[69]. These amendments do not have retrospective force. The Constitutional Court 
disagreed with the reading-in proposed by the high court which effectively amounts 
to incorporating the provisions (and options of orders) of s 78(6) into s 77(6). The 
Constitutional Court argued that there is a logical reason for accused persons under 
s 77 to be treated differently from those under s 78. Also see De Vos HC case supra 
(n36) at para [52]. For further discussion on the court’s approach and comparison 
between these two sections, see Janse van Rensburg op cit (n45) 12-15.
126 De Vos CC case supra (n1) at para [55], footnote 61.
127 Section 77(6)(a)(ii)(dd) of the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 4 of 2017. 
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accused should be detained as a state patient or an involuntary mental 
health care user. The trial on the facts will now after the Amendment 
Act serve as a mechanism to facilitate the unconditional release of an 
accused in appropriate cases. 
The Amendment Act does not, however, address assessing 
dangerousness for purposes of detaining a state patient in prison 
temporarily.128 Is dangerousness assumed based on the violent nature 
of the charge against the accused?129 It is also not clear to what extent 
the criteria for involuntary mental health care as set out in the Mental 
Health Care Act will be considered, if at all, when the court orders that 
an unfit accused be detained as an involuntary mental health care user 
as per s 77(6)(a)(ii).
5 Conclusion
The new legal position brought about by the Amendment Act, as 
motivated by the De Vos judgment, ensures a victory for judicial 
discretion and the unfit accused’s right to freedom and security of the 
person. The changes brought about by the Amendment Act end the 
practice of automatic detention of all unfit accused. Such detention was 
arbitrary and without just cause as it was based on an assumption of 
dangerousness due to the presence of a mental illness. Mental illness 
is no longer in itself the reason for detention in prison.130  
The new regime leaves room for the court to exercise discretion in 
that the amended s 77(6)(a)(i) and (ii) enables the court to craft orders 
with due consideration to the individual circumstances of the case 
including the nature of the accused’s mental condition and whether it is 
treatable. Unfit accused persons may now be released unconditionally 
(if found to have committed a minor offence or not to have committed 
the act in question) or released conditionally into the care of suitably 
skilled people to provide treatment or rehabilitation on an outpatient 
basis where appropriate. 
128 The temporary detention of a state patient in prison while awaiting a bed in a 
psychiatric facility is allowed if the court is of the view that the accused poses a 
danger to himself or others. See s 77(6)(a)(i)(bb) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 
of 1977 as amended. The fitness assessment that takes place under s 79, however, 
does not allow for the assessment of dangerousness.
129 Khan op cit (n18) 44 suggests that this is the leap that the Constitutional Court made 
when it found that hospitalisation of unfit accused persons are warranted under 
s 77(6)(a)(i) merely based on the fact that the charges against such accused stems 
from an allegation of murder, culpable homicide, rape or another act involving 
violence. 
130 State patients could be detained in prison pending the order of release from a 
judge in chambers. Detention of an unfit accused in prison is no longer allowed 
unless such detention is temporary while the accused awaits a bed in a psychiatric 
hospital. 
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Orders for conditional or unconditional release of unfit accused 
persons, could arguably free up much-needed resources in the 
criminal justice system131 and mental health care system,132 as unfit 
accused persons will no longer automatically be detained in prison or 
institutions for treatment as the case was before. 
131 State patients may no longer be detained in prison for purposes of treatment which 
will free up space in prisons. State patients may only be detained in a correctional 
facility temporarily while awaiting a bed in a psychiatric hospital.
132 The fact that not all unfit accused persons will automatically be detained for 
purposes of treatment, will arguably aid in lightening the load on resource-strapped 
psychiatric facilities which previously had to provide treatment to all unfit accused 
persons who, by order of court, had to receive treatment as a state patient in terms of 
s 77(6)(1)(i) or an involuntary mental health care user under s 77(6)(a)(ii) regardless 
of whether the condition was treatable.
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